After a reportedly heated debate among EU leaders, the EU has adopted its long announced tenth package of sanctions at the anniversary of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. The latest package introduces yet another set of comprehensive sanctions, including additional financial sanctions on individuals, companies, and three additional Russian banks, the expansion of export and import bans, measure aimed at strengthening enforcement and preventing circumvention, as well as further measures. No additional measures were taken with respect to Belarus. Here are the details:

After 6 years of a loud silence, Germany has re-established its relationship with Brazil. Chancellor Olaf Scholz paid an official visit to Brazil on 30 January 2023 with a bag of 200 million euros in investments on environmental / sustainability initiatives in Brazil, and a clear interest on fostering sustainable agriculture, the production of green hydrogen and to advance trade agreement between the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) and EU.

Germany is moving forward with its tender structure for purchasing Green Hydrogen (GH2) subproducts, such as ammonia, methanol, and aviation fuel from countries outside the EU. It is the first time that this unique scheme is being implemented, aiming to foster the international market of GH2. Although the deadline is approaching, there is still time to take part of it. Nevertheless, these are the first tenders of a recurrent and regular purchase procedure, in order to bring the necessary security on the demand side, so that the new projects on the supplier side can be structured.

As the Russian aggression against Ukraine continues, the EU has consistently expanded its sanctions against Russia. Whereas legal action by the EU has so far been limited to the extension of individual and sector-related sanctions, plans have ripened to increase the effective implementation of these sanctions. The EU Commission has now presented a draft Directive to harmonize the definition of criminal offences and penalties for violations of the restrictive measures within the EU. In addition, the EU member states, together with the other G7 states, have agreed on an oil price cap, which is meant to reduce Russian revenues. Finally, the imposition of further restrictions is currently under discussion. It would be the ninth package of sanctions against Russia since the beginning of the war in early 2022. We have summarized these three crucial developments in EU sanctions law below.

Mit Urteil vom 17. Mai 2022 hat der Bundesfinanzhof (BFH) bestätigt, dass es im Rahmen der Ermittlung des Zollwertes für Wareneinfuhren ohne Belang ist, wenn der Transaktionswert nachträglich angepasst wird (Az. VII R 2/19). Das Urteil stellt das Ende des sog. Hamamatsu-Verfahrens dar, in dem bereits der Europäische Gerichtshof (EuGH) Stellung bezogen hatte (Urteil vom 20. Dezember 2017, C-529/16). Kern des Verfahrens ist die Frage, ob sog. Verrechnungspreisanpassungen bei grenzüberschreitenden Geschäften zwischen verbundenen Unternehmen im Rahmen der Ermittlung des Zollwerts nachträglich zu berücksichtigen sind. Bemerkenswert an der Entscheidung des BFH ist daher nicht so sehr das Ergebnis, wohl aber, dass der BFH sich auch über die Konstellation des konkreten Streitfalls hinaus zur Nichtberücksichtigung von nachträglichen Preisanpassungen geäußert hat.

On 1 January 2023, the “Act on Corporate Due Diligence Obligations in Supply Chains” (the “Act”) will enter into force for companies with more than 3000 employees in Germany. In order to specify the obligations under the Act, the Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (“BAFA”) published several guidance documents, most recently one on the complaints procedure (in German) under Sec. 8 and 9 of the Act. In this briefing, we summarize the main specifications and recommendations provided in the guidance document.

As of January 1, 2023, companies that fall under the scope of the German Supply Chain Due Diligence Act (LkSG) will be subject to a reporting obligation. To facilitate the timely and complete implementation of this obligation, BAFA has now published a catalogue of questions that provides a detailed insight into the structure and content of the reporting expected by the authorities. In the following, we briefly outline the most important components and added values of this questionnaire.

Das Bundeskabinett hat sich am 26. Oktober 2022 mit dem gemeinsamen Referentenentwurf des Bundesministeriums der Finanzen und des Bundesministeriums für Wirtschaft und Klimaschutz für ein zweites Sanktionsdurchsetzungsgesetz beschäftigt. Das „Gesetz zur Durchsetzung der vom Rat der Europäischen Union im Bereich der gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik beschlossenen wirtschaftlichen Sanktionsmaßnahmen“ (Sanktionsdurchsetzungsgesetz – SanktDG) soll die effektive Durchsetzung von Sanktionen sicherstellen. Nachdem die praktische Bedeutung von Sanktionen aufgrund der Antworten der EU auf den Ukrainekrieg in jüngster Zeit drastisch zugenommen hat, hatte bereits das erste Sanktionsdurchsetzungsgesetz punktuelle Verbesserungen vorgenommen. Das zweite Sanktionsdurchsetzungsgesetz soll nun die nötigen strukturellen Änderungen bringen und enthält zu diesem Zweck eine ganze Reihe von neuen Durchsetzungsbefugnissen für die zuständigen Behörden. Gleichzeitig soll das Gesetz die Bekämpfung von Geldwäsche erleichtern. Aufgrund von europarechtlichen Fristen muss es bis zum 1. Januar 2023 verabschiedet werden. Zudem enthält der Referentenentwurf Änderungen von weiteren Gesetzen.

In the 2022 State of the Union the President of the European Commission, President von der Leyen, stressed the economic importance and high supply risk of critical raw materials (CRMs), such as lithium, magnesium, rare earths, and others. In this context, she announced the implementation of the CRM Act, of which the feedback and public consultation period is currently ongoing until 25 November 2022. The topic of CRMs and the EU’s dependency on non-member states for supply is not novel but gained traction in light of the invasion of Ukraine by Russia and the EU’s reliance on Russian gas and oil. At the same time, China is by far the biggest supplier of CRMs to the EU, and China had used its supply of CRMs as a geopolitical response. In possible future conflicts with China, it can be assumed that China will again use CRM supply geopolitically. The CRM Act is the latest example of the EU’s intention to push towards a digital and sustainable future, the “Twin Transition”, as well as strengthen EU resilience and security. It exemplifies the EU institutions’ unanimous effort to reduce strategic dependencies to ensure the “Twin Transition” of the EU economy.

Since the Russian invasion began in February 2022, the EU has repeatedly expanded its key legal instrument when it comes to trade and sector-specific sanctions against Russia: Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 (Regulation). Among the various restrictions, several provisions of the Regulation sanction the flow of goods from Russia, prohibiting not only the import but also the purchase and transfer of a wide variety of goods. In its extensive FAQs, the EU Commission has attempted to explain these bans in more detail. As helpful as these interpretations are in principle, however, they have created considerable uncertainty relating to the scope of these prohibitions.