Same Same But Different

Belarus has supported its close ally Russia in its invasion of Ukraine from the outset. In response, the European Union (EU) imposed a first set of sanctions against Belarus as early as February 2022 - under the long-standing sanctions regime established in 2006 - and has regularly expanded the scope of restrictive measures against the country over the past two years. While some restrictions were already aligned with the Russia sanctions regime, the sanctions against Belarus, which were last amended in August 2023, did not keep pace with the development of the Russia sanctions. Until recently.

Shortly after the adoption of the 14th sanctions package against Russia, the EU imposed new restrictive measures against Belarus, which served to align the sanctions regime against Belarus with that against Russia and thus to combat the circumvention of Russian sanctions via Belarus. However, this alignment does not mean that the distinction between Russia and Belarus has become obsolete in terms of sanctions compliance. As noted by the European Commission, the new measures have been tailored to the specific characteristics of EU-Belarus trade and are intended to be a proportionate response to the level of Belarus' involvement in Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine.

This briefing provides a brief overview of the new Belarus sanctions, which entered into force on 1 July. To help navigate the two sanctions regimes, we then provide a comparison of the Belarus and Russia sanctions regimes, highlighting key similarities and differences.

Overview of key changes of the new Belarus sanctions

The new amendments to Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 (the Belarus Regulation) have been implemented by amending Regulation (EU) 2024/1865. These are the main additions to the Belarus Regulation:

• Export restrictions have been extended to additional advanced technology goods (see the expanded Annex Va) as well as to industrial goods, maritime navigation equipment, several luxury goods and oil refining items (Articles 1bb, 1fd, 1ga, 1gc). Note that in the case of the luxury goods ban, there is no transition period for existing contracts.

• A prohibition on the sale, license or transfer of intellectual property rights or trade secrets related to sanctioned goods has been added to all export restrictions (e.g., Articles 1e (2) (c) or 1f (2) (c)).

• Import restrictions have been introduced on goods that allow Belarus “to diversify its sources of revenue” (Article 1ra) and on mineral products and crude oil, gold and diamonds (Articles 1h. 1rb, 1rc).

• The new sanctions impose transit bans d with respect to selected sanctioned goods, such as firearms and ammunition or dual-use and advanced technology items (Articles 1ba (1a), 1e (1a), 1f (1a)).

• It is now possible to apply for a derogation from trade restrictions in order to facilitate the divestment from Belarus (Article 8da).

• The use of (semi) trailers registered in Belarus is no longer allowed, and EU companies with 25% or more Belarusian ownership are no longer allowed to transport goods by road in the EU (Article 1zc).

• It is no longer permitted to use (semi-)trailers registered in Belarus, and EU companies owned by 25% or more by Belarussians are no longer permitted to transport goods by road in the EU (Article 1zc).

• EU companies must use their “best efforts” to prevent their foreign subsidiaries from undermining the Belarus sanctions (Article 8i)

• It has become mandatory to include a “No Belarus” clause in new contracts with customers from non-EU and non-partner country customers for certain goods (Article 8g).

• Traders in “battlefield goods” or “common high priority items” as well as their non-EU subsidiaries must implement due diligence mechanisms (Article 8ga).

• EU operators may claim compensation for damages incurred as a consequence of claims lodged with courts in third countries by Belarussians linked to contracts or transactions affected by the Belarus sanctions (Article 8h).

Comparison of the trade restrictions imposed on Belarus and Russia

The changes brought to the Belarus sanctions on 1 July 2024 strongly resemble the trade restrictions under the Russia sanctions. Considering the complexity of EU legislation, the below table aims to provide a simplified comparison between the recent changes in the Belarus Regulation and Regulation (EU) No. 833/2014 against Russia. The following concise overview may serve as a useful reference for your organization’s internal compliance procedures.

However, please note that the table provides a rough comparison only and highlights merely some of the important differences. For the purposes of clarity, the table is limited to the relevant provisions and annexes, without going into the details of distinct transitional periods, exemption or authorization provisions, accompanying prohibitions (e.g. the ban on technical assistance), and the like. Differences in the annexes to the respective regulations are only mentioned in individual cases.

As can be seen from the overview, the Belarus sanctions have been expanded mostly in alignment with the sanctions against Russia. Yet, details vary, and we strongly recommend to carefully review the amended Belarus Regulation for any implications on your company.  

BLOMSTEIN is at your disposal at any time to answer questions on the practical implementation as well as on the scope of application of these measures. Please do not hesitate to contact Roland M. Stein, Florian Wolf, Tobias Ackermann or Hanna Kurtz.