Amongst the pressing topics regarding the Defence Industry and the current challenges it faces is the question how competition policy can contribute to Europe’s security.

The EU is facing increasing pressure from global instability and a weakening rules-based order. The “Industrial Accelerator Act” (IAA), for which the Commission recently unveiled its proposal (the Proposal),  is designed to help navigate these challenges. The Proposal sets the target of raising the share of the manufacturing industry in the EU’s gross domestic product to at least 20 % by 2035. This aim shall be achieved mainly by two mechanisms: a framework for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) screening in certain sensitive sectors and “Buy European” requirements for public procurement procedures and subsidies on the other hand. While this briefing focuses on the FDI aspects of the Proposal, its “Buy European” elements are discussed separately.

Digital finance and mobile payments already account for a material chunk of retail financial transactions. Fintech adoption rates are rising in all major markets. With this comes a scramble for a share of the profits, market share and control of technological bottlenecks. In recent years, Big Tech has made steady inroads into financial services. Tech giants are using their ecosystems, technological advantages and access to large amounts of data to increase their foothold in the financial industry. Can the Digital Markets Act (DMA) shift the balance of power in this competition? All signs point to yes: The DMA creates unprecedented commercial opportunities, especially for digital and mobile payment providers and banks. These include access to data and interfaces such as NFC chips in mobile devices, safeguards ensuring non-discriminatory placement and other entry points into the ecosystems of digital gatekeepers. Some notable players are already gearing up to launch new products and reap the 'DMA dividend'. Our briefing explains which doors the DMA opens up for digital finance.

Navigating expanding regulatory frontiers

The deal-making landscape is changing fast and not in ways that make life easier for businesses and their advisors. In merger control, regulators are actively exploring ways to move beyond the traditional revenue thresholds that have long defined their jurisdiction. Across Europe, the concept of call-in regimes and post-closing reviews is gaining traction. This means that even transactions involving targets without significant market presence could, in future, be drawn into review where strategic concerns arise.

On 9 January 2026, the European Commission (EC) published Guidelines on the Foreign Subsidies Regulation. The Guidelines provide additional clarity surrounding the application of the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR), particularly with regard to (i) the assessment of distortion, (ii) the balancing test, and (iii) the EC’s powers to “call in” (i.e., request prior notification of) below-threshold M&A transactions or bids in public procurement procedures. This briefing aims to illuminate the new standards introduced by the Guidelines in order to help navigate the still nebulous regulatory landscape under the FSR.

Across Europe competition authorities are increasingly targeting M&A transactions that fall below traditional turnover thresholds. The European Commission (EC) and several National Competition Authorities (NCAs) are expanding their toolkits through call-in powers, post-closing antitrust enforcement and expansive interpretations of existing frameworks to close the gap around below-threshold deals in fear of missing out on so-called killer or roll-up acquisitions. While killer acquisitions mean large established market players buying nascent competitors to eliminate future competition, roll-up acquisitions refer to a company systematically taking over small competitors to achieve consolidation of a fragmented market.

On 23 October 2025, the European Commission adopted another set of sanctions against Russia and Belarus. The new package targets key sectors such as energy and finance, the military industrial base, special economic zones, as well as enablers and profiteers of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. It is noticeable that the new measures increasingly target third country companies outside of Russia. The EU legislator is trying to further reduce the risk of circumvention of the restrictions by extending the scope of important restrictions.

This briefing is the third in a series on the EU-Mercosur agreement, where BLOMSTEIN addresses key provisions with respect to Trade in Goods, Trade in Services, Public Procurement, Competition and Sustainability, and outlines implications and opportunities for businesses.

In this release, we focus on the Agreement’s core provisions related to Trade in Services, particularly the commitments framework, national treatment and limitations. In 2023, the EU exported €28.5 billion in services to Mercosur, while Mercosur’s service exports to the EU amounted to €13.1 billion. The Agreement is expected to significantly boost this bilateral exchange. For the EU in particular, the agreement presents expanded opportunities in strategic sectors such as business services, financial services, telecommunications, maritime transport, and postal and courier services.

Amid escalating global trade tensions, the European Union (EU) faces significant challenges as U.S. President Donald Trump announced new tariffs impacting EU exports and sending shockwaves to the capital markets. A 20% tariff on all EU imports starting April 5, 2025 were introduced. These measures are claimed to reduce the U.S. trade deficit and bolster domestic manufacturing. As an affected company, you can check this list of exempted products not subject to the 20% additional tariffs. However, please be aware that some of these products are subject to their own tariffs, such as the 25% tariff on imported automobiles and automobile parts.

Two months after the European Commission published its Competitiveness Compass, we take a deeper look into its strategic vision to enhance the EU’s economic resilience and global competitiveness (following up on our first overview), namely the competition law aspects. The Commission is rather clear that it seeks to establish Europe’s competitiveness as the new “North Star”. However, what is not so clear: Through which paths will the Commission lead us on our journey to this North Star?