The recent “Nexperia crisis” sparked an initiative by the German Automotive Industry Association (VDA) which created a platform enabling carmakers and suppliers to offer and request leftover semiconductor stock. The platform is supposed to mitigate acute chip shortages (notably involving components from Nexperia), which threatens vehicle production in Germany, by effectively connecting players across the industry and efficiently matching supply and demand. The Federal Cartel Office (FCO) gave his blessing with President Andreas Mundt stating that the information exchange implied could improve the allocation of scarce chips and help delay production cuts, ultimately benefiting both the industry and consumers. The VDA semiconductor platform follows a pattern of industry-led digital trading platforms that have sought and received antitrust approval in Germany. This case is interesting as the FCO continues to show its openness for innovative platforms that improve market efficiency, provided certain reliable safeguards are built-in to prevent anti-competitive information exchanges.

On 23 October 2025, the European Commission adopted another set of sanctions against Russia and Belarus. The new package targets key sectors such as energy and finance, the military industrial base, special economic zones, as well as enablers and profiteers of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. It is noticeable that the new measures increasingly target third country companies outside of Russia. The EU legislator is trying to further reduce the risk of circumvention of the restrictions by extending the scope of important restrictions.

Bereits seit Dezember 2020 gilt in China das neue chinesische Exportkontrollgesetz. Dieses wurde zum Dezember 2024 deutlich verschärft. Insbesondere für den Export von Dual-Use-Gütern gelten durch das Inkrafttreten der neuen Verordnung zur Ausfuhrkontrolle von Gütern mit doppeltem Verwendungszweck („Dual-Use-Verordnung-CH“) deutlich höhere Anforderungen. Diese machen sich in der Praxis vermehrt bemerkbar und stellen europäische Unternehmen vor neue Herausforderungen.

Im Folgenden berichten wir von unseren Erfahrungen mit dem neuen chinesischen Exportkontrollrecht, welche wir in verschiedenen Fällen unter Zusammenarbeit mit chinesischen Kollegen gemacht haben. Wir weisen jedoch daraufhin, dass wir nicht zum chinesischen Recht beraten. Unsere Ausführungen können daher nicht als Auslegungshilfe zum chinesischen Recht verstanden werden.

This briefing is the third in a series on the EU-Mercosur agreement, where BLOMSTEIN addresses key provisions with respect to Trade in Goods, Trade in Services, Public Procurement, Competition and Sustainability, and outlines implications and opportunities for businesses.

In this release, we focus on the Agreement’s core provisions related to Trade in Services, particularly the commitments framework, national treatment and limitations. In 2023, the EU exported €28.5 billion in services to Mercosur, while Mercosur’s service exports to the EU amounted to €13.1 billion. The Agreement is expected to significantly boost this bilateral exchange. For the EU in particular, the agreement presents expanded opportunities in strategic sectors such as business services, financial services, telecommunications, maritime transport, and postal and courier services.

The increased political focus on climate and environmental protection has a particular impact on trade with chemicals. In an amendment to the REACH Regulation at the end of 2024, the European Commission banned the use of certain chemicals due to the risk of contamination. In this part of our ESG Briefing series, we provide an overview of the key provisions of the REACH Regulation and its latest amendments.

In view of the increasingly acute threat situation, driven in particular by growing doubts about the US' loyalty to NATO and the resulting restriction of the conventional and nuclear deterrence, the question arises: How well prepared is Germany for a further escalation of conflicts, especially that with Russia? Should asymmetric warfare - including against Germany - have even more far-reaching consequences, what legal instruments are available to the state in order to remain capable of acting in an external or internal emergency (innerer oder äußerer Notstand)? This briefing sheds light on the security and precautionary laws (Sicherstellungs- und Vorsorgegesetze), which have been rather neglected to date, and which (should) provide the necessary instruments for such situations.

Already the first Trump administration has restricted international trade by imposing tariffs of up to 25% on imports of steel and aluminium from the European Union (EU), provoking countermeasures by the EU. In 2021, these measures ceased to apply after the EU and United States (US) reached a corresponding agreement. On 12 March 2025, the US revived the tariffs. Again, the action has prompted the EU to implement countermeasures.

Trump is back and so are his tariffs (see our previous briefing on his return to office). As the EU has once again entered his crosshairs, the trading bloc is gearing up to defend its economy. For instance, President Trump has announced 25 % tariffs on steel and aluminium imports (set to kick in early March) as well as “reciprocal” tariffs, likely implying tariff hikes to match trading partners’ tariff rates for US goods. Meanwhile, domestic EU industries are already under considerable pressure, notably due to Chinese imports such as electric vehicles (EVs).

On the third anniversary of Russia's large-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EU has once again tightened its sanctions regime against Russia and Belarus. The most important amendments concern Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 (the Russia Regulation) and Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 (the Belarus Regulation). The respective amending Regulation (EU) 2025/395 and Regulation (EU) 2025/392 introduce additional and largely parallel restrictions on Russia and Belarus. While the extension of sanctions against the Russian “shadow fleet” or the import ban on Russian aluminium was already reported in the press, the sanctions package includes additional measures that deserve closer attention. We detail the most important aspects of these changes below.

Up until this point, there has been a strong emphasis on collaboration and unison for the EU and U.S. sanctions issued to address Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine. Now, while U.S. sanctions will not disappear overnight, there appears to be some increasing daylight in the approaches taken by the U.S. versus the EU, chiefly due to the new Trump administration’s dramatic shift in foreign policy and diplomacy. We provide highlights of the changed dynamics and potential trajectory for U.S. sanctions with respect to Russia below.

Im Dickicht des Außenwirtschaftsrechts fliegt so manches Regelwerk „unter dem Radar“ – so auch die Verordnung (EU) 649/2012 (PIC-Verordnung) über die Aus- und Einfuhr gefährlicher Chemikalien. In dieser Ausgabe unserer ESG-Briefing-Reihe stellen wir die Anforderungen an den Ex- und Import gefährlicher Chemikalien im Überblick dar.