Customs law is having a moment. The EU has finalised its most far-reaching customs reform since 1968. With global trade facing heightened uncertainty from different an-gles, the reform arrives at a critical juncture. This briefing is the first in a short series examining the key aspects of the reform in detail. It provides an overview of the re-form’s background and main changes. Subsequent briefings will take a closer look at the individual building blocks of the reform in order to analyse whether the overhaul is sufficient to make the EU customs union fit for a world trade climate that is growing tougher by the day and an e-commerce sector that shows no signs of slowing down.

On 28 July 2026, the WTO panel report in Türkiye – Measures Concerning Electric Vehicles and Other Types of Vehicles from China (DS629, WT/DS629/R) was circulated. The Panel found Türkiye's additional customs duties on Chinese electric vehicles (EVs) and certain hybrids, and its import permit licensing scheme (IPLS), inconsistent with its GATT 1994 obligations. Türkiye's environmental defence under Article XX(b) and its natural-resources defence under Article XX(g) both failed. The report is not yet adopted: on 15 September 2026, China and Türkiye jointly requested the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to extend the appeal window to 27 October 2026 (WT/DS629/5). This gives the parties additional time to consider their positions amid the continued paralysis of the WTO Appellate Body, as a standard appeal could place the dispute in the "appeal into the void" situation. This briefing summarises what the Panel decided, why the green defence did not work out, and what the ruling means for similar initiatives beyond Türkiye.

On 16 September 2026, the European Commission (Commission) informed it issued a Statement of Objections concerning the proposed acquisition of Anglo American’s Brazilian nickel business by the Chinese company MMG Limited (MMG). It set out the Commission’s preliminary view that the deal may threaten European access to ‘low-carbon ferronickel’, a key alloying material used in stainless-steel production.

On 24 September 2024, the European Commission (Commission) issued a press release announcing that, from October 2024, all new anti-dumping (AD) and anti-subsidy (AS) investigations would automatically be accompanied by a registration order under Article 14(5) of the Basic Anti-Dumping Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2016/1036, BADR) or Article 24(5) of the Basic Anti-Subsidy Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2016/1037, BASR). This briefing takes a closer look at this new practice after a full two years of application to see what has and has not changed as a result.

On 10 August 2026, the European Commission (Commission) definitively imposed anti-dumping (AD) duties on imports from the Republic of Korea (Korea) and Mexico of terephthalic acid (TA), i.e., the essential feedstock for PET bottles, polyester fibres and food packaging. This Regulation is unusually rich in points that matter well beyond the TA world. It (i) signals that China is not the only target; explains how the Commission calculates (ii) dumping margin when its own sample partly do not dump and (iii) injury margin when it treats two different-behaving exporting countries as one.

According to recent press reports (examples available here and here), the European Union may be quietly assembling an economic security bloc with the United Kingdom, Japan and South Korea to shield their automotive sectors from Chinese overcapacity. No official statement made yet, and the Commission declined to confirm. This note sets out, from an EU and WTO perspective, what an “alliance" could actually mean in law, which of its plausible building blocks are already in place, and where the difficulty lies.

The European Commission has launched an 8-week consultation on whether additional categories of steel products should be covered by the EU Steel Overcapacity Regulation that came into force on 1 July 2026. Stakeholders have until 30 September 2026 to submit comments. The European Commission will decide by 31 December 2026 whether to extend the scope to cast iron pipes and hollow profiles, non-alloy and other alloy wire, stainless steel wire, and forged bars. This is the first of many reviews planned under the Regulation. It is likely to attract attention from other industries facing similar challenges.

With Regulation (EU) 2024/1781, the Ecodesign for Sustainable Products Regulation (ESPR), the European Union has introduced new standards for handling unsold goods. Since 19 July 2026, a directly applicable EU-wide ban has been in force prohibiting large companies from destroying unsold clothing, footwear, and clothing accessories.

The steel safeguards are dead, but steel protection lives on. On 30 June 2026, the safeguard measures that have protected European and British steel industries for eight years reach their legal limit. Both jurisdictions unveiled new instruments designed to tackle global steel overcapacity while sidestepping the constraints that apply to safeguards. Similar objective, different architecture. This briefing examines how the EU and UK have reinvented steel protection as from 1 July and what their new approaches reveal about the evolution of trade defence policy.

For the fifth time in ten years, German competition law is facing a comprehensive reform. On 4 June 2026, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy published its draft bill for the 12th Amendment to the Act against Restraints of Competition (ARC). Its aim is to make competition law more efficient with faster procedures and greater enforcement powers for the Federal Cartel Office (FCO). Uncontroversial mergers shall be excluded from the notification regime so that resources are freed up for cases with genuine competitive relevance. This shift in focus is complemented by new tools that were previously not available to the FCO, such as systematic screening of procurement data. What are the key elements of the proposed amendment?