Child safety online is one of the defining regulatory topics of 2026 – and it reaches far beyond social media. From mobile games and video-sharing platforms to AI chatbots, virtually every digital service that is popular with young audiences is now in the crosshairs of legislators worldwide. In December 2025, Australia became the first country to ban social media for children under 16. Brazil adopted its own statute. In the United States, a wave of state-level legislation and landmark litigation against Meta has shifted the debate from self-regulation to legal liability. In Europe, already more than twenty Member States have contemplated, drafted or notified national laws regulating minors’ access to digital services. The result is a regulatory patchwork that creates legal uncertainty for in-scope service providers.

Child safety regulation is closely linked to broader EU consumer protection policy. From the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (UCPD) to the forthcoming Digital Fairness Act, the EU is taking an increasingly paternalistic approach to digital services, with prescriptive rules that leave consumers less room to make their own choices. (for insights into this regulatory trajectory, visit Time to Riot! How to respond to overbearing consumer protection).

Licences, state recourse rights and ongoing information obligations: The ministerial draft bill for a Space Act (WRG) is intended to establish, for the first time, a general legal framework for private space activities in Germany. Unlike, for example, the USA, France or the United Kingdom, Germany does not yet have a general Space Act. The draft serves to implement the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, the Outer Space Liability Convention of 1972 and the Outer Space Registration Convention of 1975. These treaties oblige Germany to authorise and continuously monitor private space activities, as well as to be liable to other states for certain types of damage. The requirement for authorisation stems, for example, from Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty.

On 4 September 2026, the European Commission (Commission) reportedly dropped its long-awaited project for an export duty on aluminium scrap (the scrap measure) and announced that it would instead restrict waste exports to non-OECD countries via a delegated act under the Waste Shipment Regulation (WSR). This reversal is currently under consideration and has split the European Union’s (EU) aluminium value chain. This briefing explains what changed, why, and whether other EU industries can expect a similar treatment.

Customs law is having a moment. The EU has finalised its most far-reaching customs reform since 1968. With global trade facing heightened uncertainty from different an-gles, the reform arrives at a critical juncture. This briefing is the first in a short series examining the key aspects of the reform in detail. It provides an overview of the re-form’s background and main changes. Subsequent briefings will take a closer look at the individual building blocks of the reform in order to analyse whether the overhaul is sufficient to make the EU customs union fit for a world trade climate that is growing tougher by the day and an e-commerce sector that shows no signs of slowing down.

On 28 July 2026, the WTO panel report in Türkiye – Measures Concerning Electric Vehicles and Other Types of Vehicles from China (DS629, WT/DS629/R) was circulated. The Panel found Türkiye's additional customs duties on Chinese electric vehicles (EVs) and certain hybrids, and its import permit licensing scheme (IPLS), inconsistent with its GATT 1994 obligations. Türkiye's environmental defence under Article XX(b) and its natural-resources defence under Article XX(g) both failed. The report is not yet adopted: on 15 September 2026, China and Türkiye jointly requested the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to extend the appeal window to 27 October 2026 (WT/DS629/5). This gives the parties additional time to consider their positions amid the continued paralysis of the WTO Appellate Body, as a standard appeal could place the dispute in the "appeal into the void" situation. This briefing summarises what the Panel decided, why the green defence did not work out, and what the ruling means for similar initiatives beyond Türkiye.

On 16 September 2026, the European Commission (Commission) informed it issued a Statement of Objections concerning the proposed acquisition of Anglo American’s Brazilian nickel business by the Chinese company MMG Limited (MMG). It set out the Commission’s preliminary view that the deal may threaten European access to ‘low-carbon ferronickel’, a key alloying material used in stainless-steel production.

On 24 September 2024, the European Commission (Commission) issued a press release announcing that, from October 2024, all new anti-dumping (AD) and anti-subsidy (AS) investigations would automatically be accompanied by a registration order under Article 14(5) of the Basic Anti-Dumping Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2016/1036, BADR) or Article 24(5) of the Basic Anti-Subsidy Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2016/1037, BASR). This briefing takes a closer look at this new practice after a full two years of application to see what has and has not changed as a result.

On 10 August 2026, the European Commission (Commission) definitively imposed anti-dumping (AD) duties on imports from the Republic of Korea (Korea) and Mexico of terephthalic acid (TA), i.e., the essential feedstock for PET bottles, polyester fibres and food packaging. This Regulation is unusually rich in points that matter well beyond the TA world. It (i) signals that China is not the only target; explains how the Commission calculates (ii) dumping margin when its own sample partly do not dump and (iii) injury margin when it treats two different-behaving exporting countries as one.

According to recent press reports (examples available here and here), the European Union may be quietly assembling an economic security bloc with the United Kingdom, Japan and South Korea to shield their automotive sectors from Chinese overcapacity. No official statement made yet, and the Commission declined to confirm. This note sets out, from an EU and WTO perspective, what an “alliance" could actually mean in law, which of its plausible building blocks are already in place, and where the difficulty lies.

The European Commission has launched an 8-week consultation on whether additional categories of steel products should be covered by the EU Steel Overcapacity Regulation that came into force on 1 July 2026. Stakeholders have until 30 September 2026 to submit comments. The European Commission will decide by 31 December 2026 whether to extend the scope to cast iron pipes and hollow profiles, non-alloy and other alloy wire, stainless steel wire, and forged bars. This is the first of many reviews planned under the Regulation. It is likely to attract attention from other industries facing similar challenges.