The recent “Nexperia crisis” sparked an initiative by the German Automotive Industry Association (VDA) which created a platform enabling carmakers and suppliers to offer and request leftover semiconductor stock. The platform is supposed to mitigate acute chip shortages (notably involving components from Nexperia), which threatens vehicle production in Germany, by effectively connecting players across the industry and efficiently matching supply and demand. The Federal Cartel Office (FCO) gave his blessing with President Andreas Mundt stating that the information exchange implied could improve the allocation of scarce chips and help delay production cuts, ultimately benefiting both the industry and consumers. The VDA semiconductor platform follows a pattern of industry-led digital trading platforms that have sought and received antitrust approval in Germany. This case is interesting as the FCO continues to show its openness for innovative platforms that improve market efficiency, provided certain reliable safeguards are built-in to prevent anti-competitive information exchanges.

On 21 October 2025, the European Commission published a proposal to amend the EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR). The proposal came as a surprise, particularly in light of speculation that the Commission would seek to suspend the applicability of the EUDR for an additional 12 months. In a letter dated 23 September 2025 from the EU Environment Commissioner Roswall, it was ventilated the idea of postponing the implementation of the EUDR, citing technical challenges with the electronic system responsible for issuing the Due Diligence Statements (DDS) – a precondition for placing in-scope products on the EU market. The Commission acknowledged that the system may not be fully operational by the current deadline of 30 December and noted that it cannot guarantee the platform will be able to handle the expected volume. Instead of moving forward with this first approach, the Commission proposed further amendments to the text while introducing a six-month grace period during which companies would not be subject to checks or potential penalties. The proposal will most likely go to a first vote in the European Parliament either on 12-13 November or during the session of 24-27 November. The final vote, following the conclusion of the trilogue negotiations, is expected to take place during the plenary session of 15-18 December, just days before the EUDR is scheduled to begin applying on 30 December, making it a very tight timeline.

This briefing is the second in a series on the EU-Mercosur agreement, where BLOMSTEIN addresses its key provisions with respect to Trade in Goods, Trade in Services, Public Procurement, Competition and Sustainability, and outline implications and opportunities for businesses.

In this release, we focus on the Agreement’s core provisions with respect to Trade in Goods, particularly tariff elimination schedules, safeguards for impacted sectors and rules of origin.

Am 15. Januar ist das 4. Maßnahmenpaket zur Beschleunigung und Optimierung der Exportkontrollverfahren des Bundeministeriums für Wirtschaft und Klimaschutz (BMWK) und des Bundesamts für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle (BAFA) in Kraft getreten. Zielsetzung des Maßnahmenpaketes ist es, durch die Erweiterung bestehender bzw. die Einführung neuer allgemeiner Genehmigungen zur Ausfuhr bzw. Verbringung bestimmter Rüstungs- und Dual-Use-Güter die Anzahl anhängiger Genehmigungsanträge beim BAFA deutlich zu verringern. Zugleich sollen jene Anträge, die eine umfassende Einzelfallprüfung erfordern, schneller bearbeitet werden.

Donald Trump is once again president of the United States. Reactions and expectations range from optimism, driven by hopes for an anti-regulatory agenda, to fears of a trade war with China. While it is a common refrain that uncertainty is bad for business, Trump has practically made unpredictability his trademark. In some cases, events can happen so quickly that they pass each other by the hour; a rate announced one day may be temporarily suspended the next. He has made it clear repeatedly that one of his priorities during his second term would be to protect the US economy and combat the US trade deficit. Time and again, the newly sworn-in president has publicly emphasised that he will not shy away from using trade policy measures to achieve domestic and foreign policy goals.

In Freihandels- und Präferenzabkommen stecken großes wirtschaftliches Potenzial. Gerade für international ausgerichtete Unternehmen eröffnen sie die Möglichkeit, Zollkosten und andere Export- und Importbeschränkungen zu reduzieren. Die Außen- und Wirtschaftspolitik der Europäischen Union hat sich in den letzten Jahren stark auf bilaterale Präferenzabkommen konzentriert. Denn die WTO und mit ihr der Multilateralismus befinden sich in der Krise.  Die Wiederwahl von Donald Trump zum Präsidenten der Vereinigten Staaten im November 2024 hat die protektionistischen Tendenzen in der globalen Handelspolitik weiter verstärkt. Trump plant, umfassende Zölle auf Importe zu erheben, darunter einen allgemeinen Zollsatz von 10 % auf alle Einfuhren sowie spezifisch höhere Zölle auf chinesische und möglicherweise andere Waren. Diese Maßnahmen könnten den internationalen Handel erheblich beeinträchtigen und die Notwendigkeit für die Europäische Union unterstreichen, durch den Abschluss weiterer Präferenzabkommen weltweit stabile und vorteilhafte Handelsbeziehungen zu sichern.

On 21 November, the European Court of Justice (CJEU) issued a far-reaching ruling on the legal treatment of production relocations under the Union Customs Code (Harley-Davidson Europe – C-297/23 P). The decision has been rendered against the backdrop of globally growing protectionist tendencies in international trade policy.

In this third briefing on International Investment Law (IIL), we examine how IIL and in-vestor-state arbitration may be used in response to the so-called countersanctions adopted by the Russian government in retaliation to sanctions imposed by the EU and its Western partners.

In this second edition of BLOMSTEIN’s International Investment Law (IIL) briefing series, we look at how the EU’s sanctions against Russia are affecting existing investments in Russia and investment arbitrations against the Russian state. Meanwhile, our next briefing will look at the impact of Russia’s countersanctions on investors and their prospects for redress under IIL.

Empty supermarket shelves are an image German consumers have become quite used to over the recent years. Haribo gummy bears were no longer for sale at Lidl for a while, Dr. Oetker's pizza could not be shopped in Kaufland freezers and Mars stopped delivering EDEKA for a long time. It seems that increasing costs, e.g. for energy, transportation, production, have translated into price fights between manufacturers facing increased production costs on the one side, and retailers on the other, who try to keep price raises at bay knowing the hardship of passing them on to end consumers. What is interesting from a competition law perspective is that a number of these conflicts not only gained fairly high press attention but were even escalated to civil courts, where competition law arguments played a core role.