Am 8. September 2025 hat die Europäische Kommission eine Delegierte Verordnung verabschiedet, mit der die Kontrollliste für Güter mit doppeltem Verwendungszweck (sogenannte Dual-Use-Güter) in Anhang I der Verordnung (EU) 2021/821 vollständig überarbeitet und neu gefasst wurde. Die Überarbeitung wurde notwendig, um neue sicherheitsrelevante Technologien frühzeitig zu erfassen, ihre Weitergabe zu kontrollieren und die EU-Rechtslage mit internationalen Standards in Einklang zu bringen. Die Maßnahme wurde bereits im Weißbuch zu Exportkontrollen vom 24. Januar 2024 angekündigt und zielt auf eine kohärente, transparente und wirksame Kontrolle innerhalb der EU ab.

Bereits seit Dezember 2020 gilt in China das neue chinesische Exportkontrollgesetz. Dieses wurde zum Dezember 2024 deutlich verschärft. Insbesondere für den Export von Dual-Use-Gütern gelten durch das Inkrafttreten der neuen Verordnung zur Ausfuhrkontrolle von Gütern mit doppeltem Verwendungszweck („Dual-Use-Verordnung-CH“) deutlich höhere Anforderungen. Diese machen sich in der Praxis vermehrt bemerkbar und stellen europäische Unternehmen vor neue Herausforderungen.

Im Folgenden berichten wir von unseren Erfahrungen mit dem neuen chinesischen Exportkontrollrecht, welche wir in verschiedenen Fällen unter Zusammenarbeit mit chinesischen Kollegen gemacht haben. Wir weisen jedoch daraufhin, dass wir nicht zum chinesischen Recht beraten. Unsere Ausführungen können daher nicht als Auslegungshilfe zum chinesischen Recht verstanden werden.

 On August 1, 2025, additional cybersecurity requirements will come into force for a large number of electronic devices under the Radio Equipment Directive (Directive 2014/53/EU; RED). Despite this approaching deadline, many issues are still unclear, in particular the scope of application of the new regulations and the interpretation of the term "internet-connected radio equipment ".

BLOMSTEIN advised US investment firm Summit Partners on German foreign direct investment control aspects relating the sale of its shares in ELATEC to leading security and solutions provider Allegion plc. The transaction is valued at €330 million on a cash-free, debt-free basis, and is expected to close in the third quarter of 2025.

BLOMSTEIN assisted French listed investment company IDI on German foreign direct investment control aspects relating the acquisition of a majority stake in radar technology specialist Intersoft Electronics Group (IE). The transaction was carried out as a secondary leveraged buyout in close partnership with the existing management team.

“We are no longer at peace – we are under daily attack.” – Lieutenant General André Bodemann

Germany is increasingly the target of low-threshold (hybrid) attacks. These range from disinformation and espionage to sabotage. Critical infrastructure is frequently affected – such as energy and water supply, transportation, and information and communication technology. As a result, the resilience of companies, particularly those operating critical infrastructure, is coming into sharper focus in legal regulations. This is reason enough to examine to what extent businesses in Germany are currently and will in the future be held responsible for protecting themselves against such attacks and responding appropriately.

The European defence industry is undergoing profound strategic transformation. Just last week, the Commission has published its White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030, attesting “changes of a magnitude not seen since 1945” and boldly stating: “History will not forgive us for inaction.” This shift has also been felt in competition law. Recent policy discussions suggest that the traditional approach to competition enforcement — focusing primarily on market dynamics and consumer welfare — may evolve to incorporate additional considerations, in particular defence interests.

In view of the increasingly acute threat situation, driven in particular by growing doubts about the US' loyalty to NATO and the resulting restriction of the conventional and nuclear deterrence, the question arises: How well prepared is Germany for a further escalation of conflicts, especially that with Russia? Should asymmetric warfare - including against Germany - have even more far-reaching consequences, what legal instruments are available to the state in order to remain capable of acting in an external or internal emergency (innerer oder äußerer Notstand)? This briefing sheds light on the security and precautionary laws (Sicherstellungs- und Vorsorgegesetze), which have been rather neglected to date, and which (should) provide the necessary instruments for such situations.

Trump is back and so are his tariffs (see our previous briefing on his return to office). As the EU has once again entered his crosshairs, the trading bloc is gearing up to defend its economy. For instance, President Trump has announced 25 % tariffs on steel and aluminium imports (set to kick in early March) as well as “reciprocal” tariffs, likely implying tariff hikes to match trading partners’ tariff rates for US goods. Meanwhile, domestic EU industries are already under considerable pressure, notably due to Chinese imports such as electric vehicles (EVs).

On the third anniversary of Russia's large-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EU has once again tightened its sanctions regime against Russia and Belarus. The most important amendments concern Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 (the Russia Regulation) and Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 (the Belarus Regulation). The respective amending Regulation (EU) 2025/395 and Regulation (EU) 2025/392 introduce additional and largely parallel restrictions on Russia and Belarus. While the extension of sanctions against the Russian “shadow fleet” or the import ban on Russian aluminium was already reported in the press, the sanctions package includes additional measures that deserve closer attention. We detail the most important aspects of these changes below.

Up until this point, there has been a strong emphasis on collaboration and unison for the EU and U.S. sanctions issued to address Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine. Now, while U.S. sanctions will not disappear overnight, there appears to be some increasing daylight in the approaches taken by the U.S. versus the EU, chiefly due to the new Trump administration’s dramatic shift in foreign policy and diplomacy. We provide highlights of the changed dynamics and potential trajectory for U.S. sanctions with respect to Russia below.