Trump is back and so are his tariffs (see our previous briefing on his return to office). As the EU has once again entered his crosshairs, the trading bloc is gearing up to defend its economy. For instance, President Trump has announced 25 % tariffs on steel and aluminium imports (set to kick in early March) as well as “reciprocal” tariffs, likely implying tariff hikes to match trading partners’ tariff rates for US goods. Meanwhile, domestic EU industries are already under considerable pressure, notably due to Chinese imports such as electric vehicles (EVs).

On the third anniversary of Russia's large-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EU has once again tightened its sanctions regime against Russia and Belarus. The most important amendments concern Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 (the Russia Regulation) and Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 (the Belarus Regulation). The respective amending Regulation (EU) 2025/395 and Regulation (EU) 2025/392 introduce additional and largely parallel restrictions on Russia and Belarus. While the extension of sanctions against the Russian “shadow fleet” or the import ban on Russian aluminium was already reported in the press, the sanctions package includes additional measures that deserve closer attention. We detail the most important aspects of these changes below.

Up until this point, there has been a strong emphasis on collaboration and unison for the EU and U.S. sanctions issued to address Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine. Now, while U.S. sanctions will not disappear overnight, there appears to be some increasing daylight in the approaches taken by the U.S. versus the EU, chiefly due to the new Trump administration’s dramatic shift in foreign policy and diplomacy. We provide highlights of the changed dynamics and potential trajectory for U.S. sanctions with respect to Russia below.

 On 26 February 2025, the European Commission presented its long-awaited Omnibus package, purportedly aimed at simplifying a range of EU regulations, with a particular focus on the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD), the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD), and the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). The revisions respond to mounting pressure from businesses and governments, who argue that the current regulatory framework is overly complex and imposes excessive administrative burdens to ensure compliance.

With the start of 2025, the European Union has entered a new phase of technology regulation. Over the recent past, AI competition policy has already undergone significant shifts, with increased scrutiny on Big Tech investments, ‘acqui-hires’ being treated as mergers, and growing concerns over algorithmic collusion. This is the scene that Teresa Ribera has stepped foot on as the EU's new competition chief. She has inherited a regulatory framework built on robust AI oversight from her predecessor Margrethe Vestager. However, given that her mandate is broader than just competition enforcement and now includes the ambitious goals of the European Green Deal, the crucial question is: How will Commissioner Ribera's blend of competition oversight and environmental vision shape Europe's AI industry?

The second H2Global auction has officially entered its initial phase.

The draft contract documents have been released, including the auction framework, the Hydrogen Purchase Agreement (HPA), and the Price and Quantity Sheet (see here), inviting bidders to review and provide feedback.

As previously announced, BLOMSTEIN is publishing a series of briefings introducing into European and German legal defence matters.

Today’s briefing focuses on regulatory topics that might occur in relation to the investment and ramp-up phase of startups. These issues refer to export control, public procurement and foreign direct investment control law.

New federal parliament elections are due to be held in Germany on 23 February 2025. In light of the multiple international challenges, national security and defence is one of the key issues. This briefing provides an overview of the content of the election manifestos of the main political parties on the topics of the Bundeswehr, its financing and the defence industry.

Last week it became official: Germany’ will not implement the Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (known as the NIS-2 Directive) to improve cybersecurity in the EU under the current administration. See below for some guidance on what that means:

The European economy is under mounting pressure from China's rapid technological advances and industrial policy, trade uncertainties linked to the new Trump administration in the USA, and growing geopolitical instability, which impact the competitive landscape in several global markets and increase disruption risks in supply chains. In this challenging economic and political climate, enhancing the competitiveness of European businesses and reinforcing the resilience of the Single Market have become key political priorities, as outlined in the European Council's Budapest Declaration on the New European Competitiveness Deal.

Donald Trump is once again president of the United States. Reactions and expectations range from optimism, driven by hopes for an anti-regulatory agenda, to fears of a trade war with China. While it is a common refrain that uncertainty is bad for business, Trump has practically made unpredictability his trademark. In some cases, events can happen so quickly that they pass each other by the hour; a rate announced one day may be temporarily suspended the next. He has made it clear repeatedly that one of his priorities during his second term would be to protect the US economy and combat the US trade deficit. Time and again, the newly sworn-in president has publicly emphasised that he will not shy away from using trade policy measures to achieve domestic and foreign policy goals.