According to recent press reports (examples available here and here), the European Union may be quietly assembling an economic security bloc with the United Kingdom, Japan and South Korea to shield their automotive sectors from Chinese overcapacity. No official statement made yet, and the Commission declined to confirm. This note sets out, from an EU and WTO perspective, what an “alliance" could actually mean in law, which of its plausible building blocks are already in place, and where the difficulty lies.

The European Commission has launched an 8-week consultation on whether additional categories of steel products should be covered by the EU Steel Overcapacity Regulation that came into force on 1 July 2026. Stakeholders have until 30 September 2026 to submit comments. The European Commission will decide by 31 December 2026 whether to extend the scope to cast iron pipes and hollow profiles, non-alloy and other alloy wire, stainless steel wire, and forged bars. This is the first of many reviews planned under the Regulation. It is likely to attract attention from other industries facing similar challenges.

July has been a busy month for Google's legal team: the European Commission issued four decisions under the Digital Markets Act (DMA) against the tech giant. On 16 July, two compliance decisions were adopted specifying how Google must adjust Google Search and Google Android to open its services to rivals. One week later, on 23 July, the Commission released two non-compliance decisions, fining Google a total of EUR 890 million for self-preferencing in Google Search and restricting app developers on Google Play. These decisions open significant opportunities for businesses that have suffered harm from Google's practices. German courts are an attractive forum to pursue such claims. Private enforcement can be a good alternative to Brussels (see also here).

According to media reports, the European Union’s 21st package of sanctions against Russia and Belarus, published on 23 July 2026, was preceded by weeks of protracted and difficult negotiations. Several Member States succeeded in securing mitigations or concessions in favour of domestic businesses. Nevertheless, the latest package contains the most extensive listings of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies in four years, as well as a range of further tightening measures in relation to sectoral sanctions. Key measures include new restrictions targeting the Russian financial sector, the introduction of a new instrument which enables a complete prohibition on crypto-asset services from specific third countries, and the suspension of the automatic adjustment mechanism for the crude oil price cap until 15 July 2027. In addition, the package once again seeks to strengthen the legal position of European companies against abusive Russian jurisdiction.

On 22 July 2026, a coalition of European companies and organizations published an open letter calling on the Commission to enforce the Digital Markets Act (DMA) in full and without delay. The letter responds to hesitant enforcement posture, as the signatories see it: under pressure, particularly from the U.S., they accuse the Commission of holding back or delaying action under the DMA. As if reacting on the spot, the Commission announced two non-compliance decisions against Google under the DMA, just the following day imposing total fines of EUR 890 million. However, as sizeable as the fine may seem, it accounts for less than 1% of Alphabet's annual turnover and sits at the lower end of the DMA's sanctioning scale. Thus, instead of proving the signatories right by showing that public enforcement is ongoing, the decisions actually are best proof that political pressure from abroad continues to weigh on the Commission’s decision-making.

We take the opportunity to revisit the DMA's second pillar: private enforcement. Building on our March 2024 briefing, we summarize some rulings that German courts have handed down and shows how private action complements and, in some respects, outpaces the Commission's work in Brussels.

As in previous financing rounds, BLOMSTEIN advised Helsing on its Series E financing, which raised a total of USD 1.8 billion and values the company at USD 18 billion.  

Mobile game developers have long had to pay Apple and Google a 30% commission for every transaction. Under the Digital Markets Act (DMA), this is no longer the case. The DMA as well as the German equivalent (section 19a Act against Restraints of Competition (ARC)) are the weapon that lets Mario defeat Bowser. The aim of the DMA is to hold tech giants accountable regarding how they operate their platforms and to empower smaller players. For video game studios, publishers and consumers, the DMA aims to reduce restrictions, create greater control and, ultimately, a better user experience. Here is what gaming companies are now able to do under the DMA.

On June 30, the Commission published the Guidelines for the application of the Regulation (EU) 2024/3015 (Forced Labor Regulation) which prohibits products made with forced labour from being placed or made available on the EU market or exported from the EU. At the same time, it launched the Forced Labour Single Portal, which will serve as the central access point for information and submissions under the Regulation.

The European gaming industry, like many digital sectors, is currently facing a perfect storm arising from an arguably incomprehensible – some might even say incoherent – patchwork of EU regulatory requirements. Driven by the European Commission’s (Commission) ambition to establish digital sovereignty, the regulatory net has tightened, moving from general data protection (GDPR) to specific technical and behavioural obligations for companies. The following briefing breaks down the key legislation on consumer protection as well as its implications on the European gaming industry.

The steel safeguards are dead, but steel protection lives on. On 30 June 2026, the safeguard measures that have protected European and British steel industries for eight years reach their legal limit. Both jurisdictions unveiled new instruments designed to tackle global steel overcapacity while sidestepping the constraints that apply to safeguards. Similar objective, different architecture. This briefing examines how the EU and UK have reinvented steel protection as from 1 July and what their new approaches reveal about the evolution of trade defence policy.